Ceuta Was Not a Migration Crisis. It Was an Operation of Strategic Coercion By LT Gen (ret) Konstantinos Loukopoulos
Ceuta Was Not a Migration Crisis. It Was an Operation of Strategic Coercion
By LT Gen (ret) Konstantinos Loukopoulos
The public debate across Europe has, in my view, approached the recent events in the Spanish autonomous enclave of Ceuta on the North African coast (covering just 18.5 square kilometers) in an overly simplistic manner. For many observers, it was merely another migration crisis, allegedly stemming from the generally permissive migration policies of Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez.
Such an interpretation, however, overlooks the broader strategic context. Rather than a conventional migration emergency, the events in Ceuta display many of the characteristics of hybrid warfare and, more specifically, hybrid coercion.
In contemporary strategic thinking, the mass movement of people is no longer viewed solely as a humanitarian challenge. Under certain circumstances, it can be deliberately instrumentalized as a tool of political pressure. The strategic literature increasingly refers to this phenomenon as the weaponization of migration—the deliberate use of migration flows to achieve political and geopolitical objectives.
The events in Ceuta appear to fit precisely within this conceptual framework.
The Precedent Already Existed
This was not the first time such a pattern had emerged. In 2021, Spain allowed Brahim Ghali, leader of the Polisario Front, to receive medical treatment in a Spanish hospital. For readers unfamiliar with the dispute, the Polisario Front is the politico-military movement representing much of the Sahrawi people and advocating the independence of Western Sahara from Morocco.
Rabat reacted immediately. Diplomatic relations between the two countries deteriorated sharply, and within hours thousands of migrants crossed into Ceuta after Moroccan border controls were effectively relaxed. The episode was widely interpreted as a clear signal that migration could be transformed into an instrument of state pressure. Few messages could have been more explicit.
It is worth recalling that Ceuta is a city of approximately 83,000 inhabitants, with around 40–45 percent of its population being Muslims of predominantly Moroccan origin. Its unique demographic composition, combined with its geographical position on the African continent, makes it particularly vulnerable to this type of pressure.
Sánchez's Visit to Algeria Altered the Strategic Context
Only days before the latest crisis, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez travelled to Algeria for the first time in four years. The visit was about far more than energy cooperation.
Algeria is Morocco's principal regional rival, the Polisario Front's main supporter, and Rabat's foremost strategic competitor in the dispute over Western Sahara. From Morocco's perspective, any substantial improvement in relations between Madrid and Algiers inevitably affects the regional balance of power.
Western Sahara itself remains one of North Africa's most strategically significant territories. The dispute is not simply about sovereignty; it encompasses access to the Atlantic Ocean, some of the world's largest phosphate reserves, the prospect of offshore energy and critical mineral resources, and control over maritime routes linking the Atlantic with the Mediterranean.
Consequently, the Western Sahara dispute shapes not only relations between Morocco and Algeria but also the strategic calculations of Spain, France, the United States and the European Union throughout the Western Mediterranean.
The Trump Factor
Any assessment of the Ceuta crisis would be incomplete without considering the Trump factor.
Donald Trump was the first U.S. President to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara in December 2020 as part of the broader framework of the Abraham Accords. That decision represented far more than a symbolic diplomatic gesture. It fundamentally reshaped U.S. strategic policy toward Morocco, elevating Rabat into one of Washington's most important security and political partners in North Africa and the Western Mediterranean.
At the same time, relations between Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and President Trump have deteriorated considerably. Their disagreements extend well beyond defense spending and NATO burden-sharing to encompass trade, the Middle East, and, more recently, Spain's strong opposition to the U.S. military campaign against Iran. President Trump has repeatedly criticized not only Sánchez personally but Spain as a whole, questioning Madrid's strategic reliability as an ally.
Two recent developments deserve particular attention.
First, only two weeks before the events in Ceuta, the U.S. House of Representatives approved legislation expressing support for the eventual transfer of the two Spanish enclaves—Ceuta and Melilla—to Morocco. While the bill does not constitute U.S. policy, its political symbolism is difficult to ignore.
Second, on 1 August, President Trump sent a letter to King Mohammed VI reaffirming U.S. recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and encouraging his administration to accelerate American investment in the territory, particularly in energy, critical minerals and defense industries.
Whether this sequence of events represents simple coincidence or reflects a broader geopolitical alignment remains an open question. Nevertheless, the convergence of American, Moroccan and Israeli strategic interests across the wider Western Sahara–Strait of Gibraltar region has undeniably created a new strategic environment.
The Netanyahu Factor
Relations between Madrid and Jerusalem have also deteriorated significantly.Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has emerged as one of the most outspoken European critics of Israeli military operations in Gaza. Spain's recognition of a Palestinian state in 2024, coupled with repeated public criticism of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government, has further strained bilateral relations.
Against this backdrop, one statement attributed to Netanyahu has attracted particular attention: "Spain has repeatedly chosen to side against Israel. I do not intend to allow any country to wage a diplomatic war against Israel without paying a direct price." Regardless of how one interprets that statement, it reflects the depth of political tensions between the two governments.
Conversely, relations between Israel and Morocco have reached their highest level since diplomatic normalization. Strategic, intelligence, defence and economic cooperation has expanded significantly, while both countries increasingly view each other as indispensable regional partners.
From a geopolitical perspective, Israel could advance Morocco's position through three distinct channels.
First, by framing Ceuta and Melilla internationally as lingering remnants of European colonialism rather than merely bilateral territorial disputes.
Second, by reinforcing within Washington the argument that Morocco represents a cornerstone of Western security in the Western Mediterranean, controlling the southern approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar and serving as one of America's longest-standing strategic partners in the Arab world.
Third, by highlighting what many Israeli commentators describe as an inconsistency in Spain's foreign policy. Madrid has been among Europe's strongest critics of Israeli territorial policies while simultaneously retaining sovereignty over two European enclaves on African soil that predate the modern State of Israel by several centuries.
Whether these arguments are persuasive is ultimately a matter of political judgment. Their existence, however, illustrates how the Ceuta crisis extends well beyond migration management and has become intertwined with broader geopolitical rivalries involving Spain, Morocco, Algeria, Israel and the United States.
Μία σημαντική επισήμανση
The Weaponization of Migration
The Ceuta crisis displays nearly every characteristic of what contemporary strategic literature defines as the weaponization of migration. Rather than deploying military force, states can exploit the movement of civilians to achieve political objectives. Large-scale migration flows generate political crises, social tension, economic costs, domestic polarization and intense media pressure on the targeted government.
For Greece, this concept is hardly theoretical. The events at the Evros border in 2020 demonstrated how migration can be deliberately instrumentalized as a means of coercion. It is therefore difficult to understand why—if the reports concerning the recent joint declaration by twenty-two EU member states are confirmed—the political focus appears to have been directed primarily at criticizing the Spanish government rather than examining Morocco's role in triggering the crisis.
In reality, only one ingredient is required: the selective relaxation of border controls. Once thousands of people begin crossing simultaneously, the political consequences become almost inevitable. Governments come under immediate pressure, societies become polarized, humanitarian organizations mobilize, and international media amplify the crisis.
That is precisely why NATO and the European Union increasingly classify such actions as gray-zone operations and hybrid coercion rather than ordinary migration emergencies.
A New "Green March"?
History offers an instructive parallel. In November 1975, Morocco organized the Green March, mobilizing hundreds of thousands of civilians to create political facts on the ground in Western Sahara without initiating a conventional military invasion.
Today's strategic environment is different, yet the underlying logic remains strikingly similar. There is no longer a need to mobilize hundreds of thousands of demonstrators. Tens of thousands of civilians moving simultaneously toward a European border may achieve comparable political effects.
The instruments have changed. The strategic logic has not.
Europe Still Misreads the Threat
The European Union's greatest weakness is not a lack of capabilities. It is a persistent tendency to interpret such events primarily as migration management problems rather than manifestations of strategic coercion.
This distinction matters. If migration is understood exclusively as a humanitarian challenge, governments inevitably focus on reception facilities, asylum procedures and border management. If, however, migration is deliberately instrumentalized by a state actor to influence another state's political decisions, the issue moves into an entirely different strategic category.
The real question, therefore, is not why fifty thousand people suddenly appeared at Ceuta. The real question is who benefited strategically from the crisis, what political message was intended, and why the timing coincided with Spain's renewed engagement with Algeria, the deterioration of Madrid's relations with the Netanyahu government, and the changing strategic environment associated with President Trump's return to office.
In hybrid warfare, coincidences are rare. Strategic timing rarely is.
Conclusions
The events that unfolded in Ceuta last week cannot be adequately explained as a conventional migration crisis. All available indicators point toward an operation of strategic coercion.
Morocco's objective was not territorial conquest—at least not on this occasion—nor direct military confrontation. Rather, it appears to have sought the creation of sufficient political, societal and informational pressure to encourage the Spanish government to reconsider foreign-policy choices perceived as contrary to Moroccan interests—or, potentially, to those of another actor whose strategic objectives converged with Rabat's.
No publicly available evidence demonstrates operational coordination between Washington, Jerusalem and Rabat in relation to the events in Ceuta. Nevertheless, the convergence of strategic interests, the broader geopolitical context and the remarkable sequence of recent developments merit careful analysis rather than dismissal as mere coincidence.
Ultimately, modern strategic competition is increasingly conducted not through conventional military operations but through the manipulation of political vulnerabilities, social pressures and informational dynamics.
Ceuta may well prove to be remembered not primarily as a migration crisis, but as one of the clearest recent examples of strategic coercion through the weaponization of migration.
