Russia’s Next Move Against NATO: What Simulations Reveal About Future Conflict

Russia’s Next Challenge to NATO Has Already Begun

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, policymakers and analysts have devoted enormous attention to the question of what Russia might do next. Much of this discussion has focused on the possibility of a future military confrontation between Russia and NATO. Some observers worry about the Baltic states, while others point to the Arctic or the Suwałki Gap as the most likely flashpoints for future conflict. To explore these possibilities, I conducted a series of simulations examining Russian strategic decision-making in the years following the current phase of the war in Ukraine. The results consistently pointed toward a conclusion that differs from much of the public debate. Across the simulation runs, approximately 60 percent of outcomes produced an expanded campaign of hybrid warfare against NATO members. Fewer than 15 percent resulted in a direct military challenge to alliance territory. The remaining outcomes were divided among regional military probes, Arctic competition, and efforts directed primarily outside Europe. The simulations suggest that Russia’s next challenge to NATO is unlikely to involve tanks crossing borders. Instead, Moscow is far more likely to intensify a campaign that is already underway across Europe.

This finding should not be particularly surprising. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated both the utility and the limitations of conventional military power. Large-scale military operations are expensive, politically risky, and difficult to sustain over long periods. They consume manpower, equipment, ammunition, and economic resources. More importantly, they tend to unify opponents. Whatever disagreements existed within NATO prior to February 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine strengthened alliance cohesion, encouraged increased defense spending, and expanded NATO itself. From Moscow’s perspective, repeating a strategy that produced greater alliance unity would make little strategic sense. Russian leaders have every reason to seek methods of competition that impose costs on the West without producing the same degree of political solidarity.

The simulations repeatedly demonstrated that hybrid warfare offers exactly this opportunity. Russian decision-makers consistently favored strategies that allowed them to challenge NATO while avoiding actions likely to trigger a direct military response. Cyberattacks, sabotage operations, infrastructure disruptions, intelligence activities, influence campaigns, economic pressure, and information warfare all emerged as preferred instruments because they provide strategic benefits at relatively low cost. Most importantly, they create ambiguity. Governments may disagree about who was responsible, whether an incident was deliberate, and how aggressively they should respond. This ambiguity is not a weakness from Moscow’s perspective. It is one of the primary advantages of hybrid warfare.

Perhaps the most important lesson from the simulations is that Russia does not need to defeat NATO militarily in order to achieve meaningful strategic gains. Much of the discussion surrounding European security remains focused on military balances, force structure, and defense spending. While these factors remain important, they may not represent the alliance’s greatest vulnerability. The simulations repeatedly suggested that NATO’s center of gravity is political cohesion rather than military capability. The alliance possesses overwhelming collective military strength when compared to Russia. However, that strength depends upon the willingness of member states to act collectively. Any strategy that weakens political unity can therefore generate strategic effects disproportionate to the resources invested.

This dynamic became apparent throughout the simulations. When confronted with a direct military attack, NATO actors generally responded with unity and determination. Political disagreements narrowed, support for collective action increased, and alliance cohesion strengthened. Hybrid attacks produced very different outcomes. Participants frequently disagreed about attribution, proportionality, and appropriate responses. Some favored retaliation while others advocated restraint. Some viewed incidents as isolated events while others interpreted them as components of a larger campaign. In many simulation runs, hybrid warfare generated more political friction within NATO than a conventional military challenge. From a Russian perspective, this makes hybrid warfare an exceptionally attractive strategy.

The Baltic region consistently emerged as the most likely focal point for an expanded Russian campaign. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland, and Sweden occupy a unique position within NATO’s security architecture. They sit on the alliance’s northeastern frontier, are heavily dependent on critical infrastructure, and represent areas where Russian pressure can be applied without necessarily crossing thresholds associated with conventional warfare. Yet the simulations did not suggest that Moscow would seek territorial conquest in these states. Rather, they pointed toward a gradual escalation of activities designed to raise costs, create uncertainty, and test alliance cohesion.

What is particularly striking is that many of the activities identified in the simulations are already occurring. Europe has experienced repeated cyberattacks against government institutions and private sector targets. Undersea cables and critical infrastructure have been damaged under suspicious circumstances. GPS interference has affected civilian aviation and maritime traffic in regions bordering Russia. Information operations continue to target political debates and elections throughout the West. Intelligence services across Europe have reported increased concerns regarding sabotage and covert influence activities. The question is therefore not whether Russia is willing to employ these tools. The evidence suggests that it already is. The more important question is whether Moscow decides to employ them more aggressively and in a more coordinated manner.

The simulations suggest that such an escalation is likely because it aligns with Russia’s broader strategic objectives. Moscow’s goal is not necessarily to conquer NATO territory. Rather, it seeks to weaken Western influence, limit alliance effectiveness, and increase the costs associated with resisting Russian interests. Hybrid warfare provides a mechanism for pursuing these objectives while minimizing the risks associated with conventional military conflict. It allows Russia to compete continuously rather than episodically. It permits pressure to be applied across multiple domains simultaneously. Most importantly, it enables Moscow to challenge NATO without triggering the type of response that a conventional military attack would almost certainly produce.

Western policymakers should therefore be cautious about preparing for the wrong conflict. Discussions about future Russian aggression often focus on the possibility of another Ukraine. The simulations suggest that this is unlikely to be the primary challenge facing NATO in the coming years. Russia has already observed the costs associated with large-scale conventional warfare. It has also observed the difficulties democratic societies encounter when responding to ambiguous forms of aggression. Rational decision-makers generally seek strategies that maximize gains while minimizing risks. From that perspective, an expanded campaign of hybrid warfare appears considerably more attractive than a direct military confrontation with the world’s most powerful military alliance.

The central conclusion of the simulations is straightforward. Russia’s next challenge to NATO is unlikely to begin with an invasion. In many respects, it has already begun. The greatest danger facing the alliance is not that it fails to recognize a conventional military attack. Such an attack would be obvious. The greater danger is that alliance leaders continue to view cyberattacks, sabotage operations, infrastructure disruptions, GPS interference, and influence campaigns as isolated incidents rather than components of a broader strategy. If the simulations are correct, the future of competition between Russia and NATO will not be defined by dramatic battlefield offensives. It will be defined by a persistent effort to weaken alliance cohesion through pressure that remains below the threshold of war while still producing meaningful strategic effects.